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ABSTRACT 
Sensitive records stored in the cloud such as healthcare records, private conversation and credit card information 
are targets of hackers and privacy abuse. Current information and record management systems have difficulties 
achieving privacy protection of such sensitive records in a secure, transparent, decentralized and trustless 
environment. The Blockchain technology is a nascent and a promising technology that facilitates data sharing and 
access in a secure, decentralized and trustless environment. The technology enables the use of smart contracts that 
can be leveraged to complement existing traditional systems to achieve security objectives that were never possible 
before. In this paper, we propose a framework based on Blockchain technology to enable privacy-preservation in a 
secured, decentralized, transparent and trustless environment. We name our framework SmartCoAuth. It is based on 
Ethereum Smart Contract functions as the secure, decentralized, transparent authentication and authorization 
mechanism in the framework. It also enables tamper-proof auditing of access to the protected records. We analysed 
how SmartCoAuth could be integrated into a cloud application to provide reliable privacy-preservation among 
stakeholders of healthcare records stored in the cloud. The proposed framework provides a satisfactory level of data 
utility and privacy preservation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Due to the huge number of data breaches experienced in organizations such as the healthcare industry, researchers 
have since proposed and implemented several techniques in order to mitigate the attacks. Protecting the privacy of 
sensitive records of patients which are kept by a provider in the cloud is of high priority due to the negative effect it 
can cause to the victims and other stakeholders. In the case of healthcare, these records could be Personal Health 
Records (PHR) of patients or general Electronic Healthcare Records (HER). 
  
Privacy in computer security generally refers to the control that data subjects or owners have on their records and 
how they are able to influence what information is collected and stored about them as well as by whom and to whom 
the said information is disclosed [1]. With respect to Healthcare records and the requirement of HIPAA, the major 
goal is to properly protect the health information while at the same time allowing the sharing of the records needed 
for providing quality healthcare services as well as protect the wellbeing of the public [2]. 
The abuse on EHR also has financial implications due to the fines that come as a result of violating the privacy 
requirement. Maintaining the privacy of HER is therefore paramount and of high priority, to the provider and other 
stakeholders because the abuse of the privacy requirements of the records can have detrimental effects and 
consequences. Their goal is to prevent access to such private records by unauthorized users. 
 Due to over-dependence on traditional system architecture, attackers have various and sometimes easier ways to 
subvert the system in other to breach the data privacy or security of sensitive records such as EHR stored in the 
cloud. Given such traditional architecture, the security and protection of these records are trusted in the hands of a 
single provider such as a healthcare centre or provider. Unfortunately, some of these healthcare centres suffer from 
various forms of attackers. According to the April 2019 Healthcare Data Breach Report by HIPAA [3], April 2019 
has been one of the worse months for data breaches of healthcare records. Improper Disposal, Loss, Theft, 
Unauthorized Access/Disclosure and Hacking/IT Incident are reported to be the categories of causes of these 
breaches. according to [3] report. it goes without saying that traditional or existing data management systems need 
improvement or at least needs to some added layer security to help reduce or mitigate these data security breaches. 
Moreover, it is very difficult to assure transparency and data integrity with the existing traditional management 
system. For example, Patients record can be altered without the immediate awareness of the data owners. Imagine, 
a patient with HIV Negative status gets the record modified to HIV Positive by an unauthorized or malicious user. 
This can be detrimental and have dire consequence on the stakeholders of the records. 
 The aim of privacy-preservation is to provide protection of the privacy of the records during authorized disclosure 
and prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to the said records. The providers and data subjects, in this case, 
should have control over what, how and whom the records are shared with. This also forms the aim and goal of this 
paper. 
  
 In order to provide these security assurances, we designed a generic query authorization and authentication smart 
contract based on the Ethereum Blockchain technology.  
 The Blockchain technology, first proposed by [4] and used as a cryptocurrency, is a form of distributed ledger 
technology that stores transactions or records in blocks which are linked to each other in an incremental manner by 
the help of cryptography such that a change in a block invalidates the subsequent blocks. The network architecture 
of blockchain technology is decentralized and usually in a peer-to-peer form. Among the peers also known as nodes, 
there are special ones among them known as miners or block producers that are either nominated or qualify to write 
the transactions in the blocks and thereby get the other nodes to update their chain accordingly. How the selection is 
done is dependent on the underlying consensus mechanism adopted by the Blockchain in question. Bitcoin and 
Ethereum, for example, use Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus mechanism. PoW requires the Miners to perform a 
specific task such as collecting and verifying the validity of the transactions on the network and attain a specified 
target hash value by hashing the collected transactions. The hash value of their blocks should be dependent on a 
previous block in order to make it valid. This effectively makes the Blockchain technology a temper-proof, difficult 
to take down by a DDOS attack and provide trustless and transparent integrity of the records stored on the network.  
 Ever since [4] use case was proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto, there have several variants and improvements of the 
technology of which a notable one Ethereum [5] Blockchain. The Ethereum Blockchain facilitates Smart Contract 
programming which is said to be a Turing complete.  
 Ethereum Smart Contracts enable programmable interaction with Blockchain technology. The Smart contract can 
sit between users and a traditional application and this is called a Decentralized Application (DAPP). What is special 
about Blockchain smart contract is that it is a trustless intermediary or if you like an API which is immutable once 
deployed and written to the blockchain. Ethereum provides the ability to run their technology either privately or 
rather make use of their Public Blockchain network. Our proposed model makes use of the Public Blockchain but 
can also be deployed on a private network if so desired. 
 
A. Technical challenges 
Blockchain technology has potentials to provide strong and relevant security to traditional systems but it has its 
own challenges. Generally, the technology suffers from majority or collision attacks. Well-known majority attack 
  
for the public Blockchain that utilizes Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus mechanism is the 51% per cent attack. This 
refers to a miner or node owning more than 50% of the computing power of the network which gives it the capability 
of outperforming the other nodes in the mining process. The other majority attack is related to networks that depend 
on Proof-of-Stake (PoS). In that case, a miner or block producer who owns more stake or wealth on the network gets 
to monopolize the block production process. In any case, the nodes with such a power can behave arbitrarily to the 
detriment of the users of the Blockchain. Currently, the solution being relied upon is the huge cost involved in 
attempting such an attack. In other networks, the other users can also agree to penalize the offending node or block 
producer or simply decide to hard fork (branch) to a different chain on their own. salacity in terms of speed of the 
blockchain is also a challenge and till now does not really compete very well with traditional client-server systems. 
Researchers are working hard to address some of these challenges, and we intend contributing to this area in our 
future works as well. 
 The main contributions in this paper are: 1) Propose a pluggable Blockchain-based query authentication and 
authorization model, SmartCoAuth, to complement traditional systems for privacy-preservation and protection of 
data breach of sensitive records. 2) SmartCoAuth introduces query request token on the blockchain through a smart 
contract that occurs outside the data storage or record management system and thereby more secured and safer from 
common attacks on client-server architecture systems. 3) we focus our model on privacy-preservation of sensitive 
records when queried by external authorized users. In this case, their query tokens are created on the smart contract 
outside the record management system and then presented for verification before releasing such sensitive records to 
them. In addition, and unlike most other systems, our model also has the capability of providing control to selected 
stakeholders and on what to release, encrypt or not release at all. 
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Other researchers have also considered other techniques and security mechanisms to help address the privacy 
challenges faced by health records. Leveraging on the Mask Authenticated Messaging Module of IOTA DHL,  [6] 
technology demonstrated its use with a wearable gadget such as Apple Watch that records personal health 
information in storing, sharing and retrieving such records. Their file format was based on the Fast Healthcare 
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) standards proposed by the Health Level Seven International (HL7) health-care 
standards organization. This is to enable the data to be sharable with existing systems that follow the standard. Their 
  
work effectively provides patient agency over the data to be shared. The patients are in full control of their records 
and can continuously share the data with a medical provider and revoke such sharing access at will.   
Taking advantage of the Blockchain technology [7] proposed a blockchain-based framework called Ancile, by 
utilizing Ethereum smart contracts. Their framework provides secure, interoperable, and efficient access to medical 
records by patients, providers and third parties while preserving the privacy of the patient's sensitive information. 
Their goal was to analyse how their framework would be able to interact with the different needs of stakeholders and 
to understand how it could address the privacy and security concerns of the healthcare industry.  
In order to meet the health records sharing requirements of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology (ONC), [8] presented FHIRChain, a model based on Blockchain which uses the HL7 Fast 
Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) standard for sharing health records. They also developed a 
decentralized App (DAPP) using JavaScript and the Ethereum solidity smart contracts. The app was tested on the 
Ethereum testnet. Their proposed solution achieved several benefits such as increased modularity, fine-grained 
access control, identifiability & authentication and permission authorization. Effectively they were able to 
demonstrate data sharing by data owners without the need to upload or download data such as is the case of traditional 
server-client architecture. 
On Personal health records (PHR) privacy preservation and sharing,  [9] proposed OmniPHR, a blockchain-
based model that integrates PHR for the use of both healthcare providers and patients. It effectively enables patients 
to have and maintain their health records in a unified environment from any gadgets of their choice and anywhere 
they find themselves. Healthcare providers benefit from the proposed solution by having their patient's records 
sharable among other providers. 
 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Block production 
Following the protocol of the network by performing special tasks and coming to an agreement on the final state 
of the blockchain by the participating nodes is known as Consensus Mechanism in Blockchain terminology. It is a 
core and most important aspect of Blockchain Technology. To this end, nodes in a PoW network compete to create 
  
blocks for other nodes to accept by verifying and approving transactions sent by users on the network after which 
they hash the results by including the hash of the previous block and a special integer known as the nonce. The final 
hash is supposed to be a value that is below or equal a target hash else the miner needs to keep trying different 
combination of the nonce and selected transactions until this target hash is attained. Finally, the miner sends this 
block to the other nodes or peers on the network for acceptance. It is only then the majority of the nodes accept this 
block and continue mining on top of it. Bitcoin and Ethereum use this kind of mechanism to reach consensus on the 
blocks. In other networks such as PoS networks, the block producers, in this case, do not have to perform mining 
activity i.e. compete in finding a target hash but rather stake their wealth and gain the right to create the next block 
on top of the current block. The requirement in all cases is to have the blocks link to previous ones. This link goes 
back to the first-ever block known as Genesis Block. The Genesis Block is fixed and given at the start or initial stage 
of the network in question. 
Our model depends on the Ethereum Blockchain network hence rely on the consensus mechanism it utilizes. This 
means the success or failure of the Ethereum Blockchain affects our model accordingly. 
 
B. Ethereum Smart Contract 
Ethereum Blockchain allows a Turing complete kind of programs known as Smart Contracts to be deployed on 
the Blockchain and interacted with by external users. These smart contracts are executed as a special kind of 
transaction and are then mined or written to a block in the blockchain just like regular cryptocurrency transactions. 
After the deployment, external applications can call or execute functions in the smart contract which will intend 
present exactly what it is programmed to do. The Smart contracts operate in what is known as the Ethereum Virtual 
Machine (EVM). The smart contracts are usually written in a high-level programming language such as Solidity or 
Vyper and are then converted to Bytecode to be run on the EVM. Ethereum operates transactions and smart contract 
executions for that matter operates on the concept of gas. This implies that any function call, especially one that 
changes the state of the smart contract, consumes some amount of gas hence the need to pay for it and in the case of 
Ethereum, this payment is done with its cryptocurrency known as Ether. Our model requires a smart contract to be 
deployed in order to take advantage of the Blockchain technology. 
 
  
C. Signing transactions and messages 
 Blockchain technology relies heavily on public-key encryption for secure operation. Every user on the network, 
therefore, has public and private key pairs. The private keys are used to sign transactions to be sent to other users or 
smart contracts and the public keys are essentially the address to which they receive transactions from other users. 
Our model takes advantage of this to sign special secret messages needed for authentication and authorization. 
 
IV. PROPOSED MODEL: SMARTCOAUTH 
A. Overview 
Our proposed model, SmartCoAuth, make use of one smart contract and a pluggable middleware module that sits 
between users' query requests and the database as well as capable of interacting with the deployed smart contract. 
The model also requires users to sign a secret message which they will have to present to the smart contract else their 
query will not have the necessary requirement for authorization. This secret message signing is done outside the 
Blockchain and the record management system by the user. The requirement for this is that the secret message must 
be signed with the corresponding private key of the public key or Ethereum address recognized by the record 
management system. It is worth mentioning that our architecture is flexible and can have several capabilities and 
features depending on the polices and security requirements of the provider. For example, the institution or provider 
can decide to submit encrypted records in a set to the query users until they get approve decryption key from the 
patients or data subjects. However, we keep our model simple and do not go to this length. 
Fig. 1 outlines the various components that make all the SmartCoAuth architecture. It includes the Blockchain 
environment and the traditional records management system as well as the Smart Contract and the pluggable module. 
  
 
Fig. 1 The schematic structure of SmartCoAuth Architecture with the various Components 
SmartCoAuth does not need the sensitive records to be stored in the Blockchain or smart contract as it is only 
serving as an authorization and authentication middleware for privacy-preservation. All that needs to be presented 
and stored in the smart contract is the hash of the signed secret message which is signed with the private key of the 
corresponding registered address. SmartCoAuth is then smart enough to compare the submitted secret along with the 
query and the hash stored in the smart contract in order to allow or deny access to the sensitive records. The query 
request and the secret message makes up the query token which is required by the pluggable middleware 
SmartCoAuth. 
The main idea behind our model is providing a transparent, trustless and decentralized authentication and 
authorization mechanism which can also be audited by stakeholders to ascertain any possible abuse or even prevent 
one from happening. Due to the use of the Blockchain smart contract, there will be an absolute assurance that those 
who deserve to see the records are the ones who see it provided their private keys have not been stolen. And even in 
such a case, the use of their private keys by an attacker can easily be seen since the Smart Contract emits event logs 
that are permanently stored and can also be monitored remotely by the owner whenever a secret message is submitted 
on behalf of a registered query user.  
  
We now proceed to outline the individual components of the proposed model and the function as well as workings 
of each of them. The overall algorithm pertaining to the middleware along with the rulesets will be discussed as well. 
 
V. SOFTWARE COMPONENTS 
SmartCoAuth is essentially made up of an Ethereum Smart Contract and A middleware that sits between a 
database and external user query requests. The model also requires query users to have access to a third-party and 
independent encryption system outside the blockchain and the records management system which they will need to 
create the hash of the encrypted secret message for submission to the smart contract. 
A. Smart Contract:  
This is the Ethereum program deployed on the blockchain of which the users and the SmartCoAuth Middleware 
interact with. This is deployed on once and serves as the transparent and trustless platform for the stakeholders. In 
other words, all the users are aware of the logic and operation of the program and are confident about outcomes 
provided the end application utilizes it to provide the needed security. 
It is made up of two main functions which we explain below: 
1) CreateQueryToken:  
This function registers the query request which will be required by the middleware to process the query. This 
function can be made public and open for users to call it without any notable security lapses. This is because 
SmartCoAuth middleware is smart enough to know whether the token was created by a registered user or not due to 
the signing of the secret message by the registered user. However, we make it public and have the owner account of 
the contract call it. This means users must interact with it using a dedicated page in our design  
It takes in two parameters; the user address and the hash digest of the signed secret message.  The smart contract 
then registers this and a block timestamp using mapping and array data types. Finally, it emits events which are logs 
that can be monitored by external applications and users whenever the function is called. This can help in alerting 
users, tracking and auditing of the query request tokens by stakeholders. In our design, we log the user address, the 
hash of the secret message and the block timestamp. 
2) getUserQueryToken:  
  
This function returns the query token whenever the SmartCoAuth middleware requires for it. It takes in the query 
user's address as its parameter and it is expected to return the address, the hashed message and the timestamp are 
found in the smart contract. The SmartCoAuth middleware uses this information to take further action depending on 
the outcome. 
 
B. SmartCoAuth Middleware:  
This is where the ruleset, algorithm and the decision to allow or deny a query request takes place. This sits 
between a database and query requests made by users. 
Below are the rulesets for the possible query requests scenarios followed by the overall flowchart of the model 
designed to preserve the privacy of the sensitive data from external users. 
1) Overall flowchart 
Fig. 2 illustrates the overall process in our design by way of a flowchart: 
  
 
Fig. 2 Flowchart of the proposed model 
 
2) Ruleset 
The following are the proposed and possible rulesets (RS) that needs to be followed in our design: 
a) RS1: 
User.Session = {Logged_In} && Query_Request_Token={Valid} && User.Status = {Authorized} -> 
Permission = {Allowed} U View.SensitiveRecords = {Full_Veiw_Access} 
b) RS2: 
User.Session = {Logged_In} && Query_Request_Token={valid} && User.Status = {Unauthorized} -> 
Permission = {Allowed} U View.SensitiveRecords = {Restricted_View_Access} 
c) RS3: 
User.Session = {Logged_In} && Query_Request_Token={Invalid} && User.Status = {Authorized} -> 
Permission = {Allowed} U View.SensitiveRecords = {Restricted_View_Access} 
d) RS4: 
User.Session = {Logged_In} && Query_Request_Token={Invalid} && User.Status = {Unauthorized} -> 
Permission = {Allowed} U View.SensitiveRecords = {Restricted_View_Access} 
e) RS5: 
  
User.Session = {Not_Logged_In} -> Permission = {Anonymous} U View.SensitiveRecords = 
{Anonymized_View || Access_denied} 
 
As can be observed from the above rulesets, the only user who in our design qualifies to have full access to the 
query result is the authorized logged in user with a valid query request token. All other condition gets restricted view 
access based on the policy of the organization in question. Example of such restricted view access could be to 
obfuscate some key fields such as the ID, NAME, DATE OF BIRTH, MEDICAL CONDITION etc and/or only give 
aggregate result instead. 
C. Database server:  
This is where the sensitive records are stored and it can be any traditional database management system as 
PostgreSQL, SQL Server, MYSQL, MongoDB etc. The requirement in our model is that every recordset from here 
to the frontend users will have to pass through SmartCoAuth middleware. This server also stores the public key or 
blockchain addresses of the registered and authorized users even though our architecture does not necessarily require 
this to be the case. The addresses can be stored in another location if preferred provided it is reachable by 
SmartCoAuth middleware. It is also worth noting that, due to the flexibility of our model encrypted version of 
sensitive fields or records can be stored here instead and get decrypted on the fly if so desire. In the same vein, hashes 
of the addresses can also be stored for confidentiality purposes and if this is done then users provide their registered 
addresses for SmartCoAuth to verify before granting them the needed access. We, however, keep our model simple 
in this paper without hashing or encrypting the records stored in the database. 
D. External Encryption Manager:  
This is the external secret message signing for the users and it is independent of the blockchain and the records 
management system. In our case, we use the Ethereum remix platform (https://remix.ethereum.org) for this purpose 
but any other suitable application can be used. 
E. Ethereum Blockchain:  
Our design depends on the Ethereum Public Blockchain and all its security and performance provision. However, 
it is possible to have a private Blockchain set up using the Go-Ethereum (Geth). In that case, the security and 
maintenance of the Blockchain and the consensus mechanism must be decided and taken care of by the institution. 
  
 
VI. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS ANALYSIS 
The proposed solution was simulated on a Windows 10 desktop Computer using Python and Web3.py API. 
Python's Django Web application framework was used to develop the Healthcare system with all the needed features 
and proposed ruleset and algorithm. The Web3.py library was used to implement the SmartCoAuth Middleware 
features that provide the added layer security between the database and the queries from the external users at the 
server-side. Web3.js was used to provide the client-side smart-contract interaction. It is important to mention that 
the server-side interaction of the smart contract with the Web3.py is not essential in our proposed model if users are 
made to interact with the smart contract on their own instead of doing so from the application. The web3.js JavaScript 
version can be used with any programming to implement the functionality of the middleware. 
We simulated the Blockchain network with Ganache, an Ethereum blockchain client for development. The 
dataset contained 12500 records with 8 attributes which when put together form the sensitive record of the data 
subjects. We measured the average processing time of the queries per record and compared it to scenarios without 
our proposed added layer security. 
 
A. Threat Model and Privacy-Preservation security analysis 
1) Stolen Private Key 
If a query request user loses his private-key and it used to create a query request token on his behalf this can result 
in impersonation attack and consequently result in data being leaked to an unauthorized user. In this case, the 
security provided by our model will be the events that are fired whenever users submit the secret message to the 
smart contract. Users are expected to monitor this event and report accordingly in order to prevent this attack. 
With SmartCoAuth approach, users can be asked to provide a special kind of secret message pattern which is 
only known to them. If this is the case, then it means the attacker also needs to know this patter besides knowing 
the private key of the user since the token will be invalid otherwise.  
In addition, since our model is pluggable to traditional application and acts as an added layer of security this also 
means that the attacker can only succeed if he has the username and password of the authorized user. 
  
2) Replay attack 
This is when the attacker attempts to use another user’s already signed secret message for his own session. This 
will fail with SmartCoAuth because the logged-in user’s Ethereum Address is known by SmartCoAuth 
Middleware and will attempt to verify the signed message with that address. If there corresponding private key 
was not used to sign this secret message, then it will fail. The only way the attacker will succeed in this case is to 
also manage to change his registered Blockchain address to match the right user. Changing address in this manner 
is assumed under our model to be impossible or not easy to do especially also because that field is a unique field 
and there should not be more than one user sharing the same blockchain address. In addition, the database 
administrators also need to approve registered address or changes made by users.  
We also recommend regular expiration of the query token for better security. 
3) Guess secret message 
If an attacker manages to guess the secret data, then he also needs to log in as the user in question in order to 
succeed with the attack. This secret data signed by the user should not be known by anyone in the first place. A 
regular expiration of the token and avoidance of secret data re-use can help prevent this attack. 
B. Performance Analysis 
We compared SmartCoAuth average query processing time as the number of results set increases with an 
approach such as [10] that depends on only the ruleset without contacting the blockchain or a smart contract. 
 
As can be observed in Figure 3, our approach entails a delay of about 25ms on average to return the results set 
than a regular approach such as [10] which does not depend on the Blockchain. This makes sense because 
SmartCoAuth middleware first needs to contact the smart contract before fulfilling any query request for improved 
security. This delay is, therefore, dependant on the performance of the Blockchain and how fast it returns results 
when smart contract functions are called. Even though there is this amount of delay it is worthwhile trade-off due to 
the added security that ensues from using it.  
    
 
  
 
 
C. Privacy preservation 
SmartCoAuth by design has several dimensions for privacy-preservation. By registering every query request 
token on the Blockchain and subsequently verifying it on the blockchain before approving them, stakeholders can 
rest assured that whoever has queried their database for sensitive records have the required and legitimate right to do 
so. More so, such request and fulfilment are monitored and tracked in a trustless environment such as the blockchain. 
Privacy also involves control of users as to who, when and how their information is shared [1]. SmartCoAuth can 
also facilitate this by having by providing encrypted results and then after have the data owners or authorized 
administrators provide special one-time decryption keys to the users who make the request. All these procedures can 
be executed and monitored on the blockchain. In the case of data being leaked, it will be easy to identify the offending 
party. The use of public-key cryptography in SmartCoAuth ensures non-repudiation security objective.  
However, even though SmartCoAuth can provide an added layer of security to existing traditional systems, any 
major flaw of that traditional system can affect its security provision. For example, if an attacker can compromise 
the database records at the database layer then SmartCoAuth middleware cannot identify this form of attack and will 
therefore not be able to track any data leak as a result. This means the security assurance of SmartCoAuth depends 
heavily on having the query request pass through the middleware for verifying, authentication and authorization. 
The use of Blockchain technology cannot be understated because records kept there are not changeable and 
cannot be tampered with once confirmed in a block and accepted by the network. This can be of tremendous help 
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during auditing. However, it is also important to note that storing too much information on the public and 
permissionless blockchain can also have some adverse effect because it can also lead to statistical analysis attacks 
and information gathering that can result in disclosure of valuable information to an attacker. Having users remaining 
anonymous or pseudonymous behind their public keys or Ethereum address can help to mitigate this. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we designed an added layer security model, SmartCoAuth, based on the Blockchain technology 
that can be implemented on to of traditional records management systems. Our model enables a transparent 
authorization, authentication and accountability of sensitive query requests by external users. The model can securely 
and in a trustless manner fulfil query requests such that the actions are monitored and audited by all stakeholders 
involved and thereby provide a transparent and tamper-resistant of who, how, when and what has been queried by 
external users. SmartCoAuth use of Smart Contract provides high-level trust of the privacy-preservation mechanism. 
SmartCoAuth was designed to complement existing traditional client-server architecture solutions. The use of 
encryption and hashing of data on the blockchain and/or the delivered records gives the assurance of non-repudiation 
and effective auditing and monitoring on the Blockchain.  
It is, however, important to note that the use of the Smart Contract implies that the success and efficiency of 
SmartCoAuth also depend on the success of the underlying Blockchain technology. We observed the overhead in 
query execution when using SmartCoAuth but we believe it is worth it given the nature of security provided by the 
Blockchain technology. We do not, therefore, suggest SmartCoAuth be the silver bullet to the impending and 
worrying data breaches over sensitive records such as healthcare records stored in the cloud. However, we continue 
to explore and research in this area for better ways and more efficient ways to meet data privacy security requirements 
in the industry. 
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